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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

CONFLICT OF TWENTY-FIRST

AMENDMENT AND IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE-

STATE TAX ON FOREIGN LIQUOR
Respondent filed a claim for refund of state import tax paid,
alleging that imposition of the Kentucky tax' violated the import-export clause of the United States Constitution. Respondent imported foreign whisky which was shipped from Scotland
via ,Chicago and New Orleans directly to respondent's Kentucky
warehouses. At the time of assessment, the foreign liquor was
in its original packages in the warehouse awaiting resale. Petitioner contended that the twenty-first amendment expressly
permits a state to write the provisions under which intoxicating
liquor may enter its borders, regardless of whether the liquor
was from other states or from foreign countries. The Kentucky
Tax Commission and a lower court denied respondent's claim,
but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed. 2 On certiorari
the United States Supreme 'Court affirmed. Held, state taxation
of foreign goods retaining their status as imports is prohibited
by the import-export clause of the United States Constitution,
and thus the twenty-first amendment does not nullify that clause
with respect to liquor. Department of Revenue v. James B.
Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
The United States Constitution prohibits the states from
levying taxes on imports and exports without the consent of
Congress, except where absolutely necessary for inspection
laws. 3 Since 1868 the import-export clause has been interpreted
as applying to goods brought from or carried to foreign countries
alone, and not to goods transported from one state to another.4
1. Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 243, § 680(2) (a) (1942) : "No person shall ship or
transport or cause to 'be shipped or transported into the state any distilled
spirits from points without the state without first obtaining a permit from the
department and paying a tax of ten cents on each proof gallon contained in the
shipment." It appears that this Kentucky statute was designed to place liquor
from without the state on an equal footing with Kentucky liquor. Cf. id. § 680(1).
2. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Department of Revenue, 367 S.W.2d 267
(Ky. App. 1963).
.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2: "No state shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ......
4. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). The Court referred
to Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 437 (1827), for a definition
of "imports." In that case, Marshall said that on the authority of lexicons
and of usage, the word imports is defined to be articles brought into the country
from a foreign country. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389
(1919); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S.
622 (1885); contra, 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNsTiTuTioN 297-304

(1953).
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The twenty-first amendment gives the states the power to
legislate concerning the importation of intoxicating liquor
within their respective borders. 5

Since the twenty-first amend-

ment does not distinguish between imports from abroad and
imports from other states, a conflict seems to exist between
the two constitutional provisions.
The manifest purpose of the import-export clause was to
confer on Congress the exclusive power to tax the act of importation, and to deny this power to the states, thereby eliminating possible conflicts among the states.6 However, when the
goods lose their character as imports, they become susceptible
to state taxation. The original package doctrine of Brown v.
Maryland8 has been recently relaxed, 9 but the Supreme Court
still holds that goods which have not lost their "distinctive
character as imports" are within the immunity of the importexport clause.' 0 To lose that "distinctive character," the goods
must be put to the use for which they were imported." In the
case of liquor imports, the first sale in the original package by
the importer cannot be taxed, as that would be taxing imports,
but all subsequent sales are taxable, regardless of whether the
12
goods are in the original package or not.
In 1933 Congress proposed the twenty-first amendment,
which repealed the eighteenth amendment. In repealing prohibition Congress intended to allow the states to enforce their own
policies toward liquor without regard to constitutional limita5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
6. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 440 (1827).
Chief
Justice Marshall stated that the design of the constitutional immunity of the
import-export clause was to prevent the great importing states from laying a tax
on the non-importing states, to which the imported goods might ultimately be
destined. This situation also "would necessarily produce countervailing measures
on the part of those States whose situation was less favorable to importation."
Accord, Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946)
Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
7. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1944).
8. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
A concise statement of the doctrine
is found in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 210 (Small ed. 1964) : "[T]he taxing power of the State
does not extend in any form to imports from abroad so long as they remain 'the
property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package' in
which they were imported."
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Bowers, United States Plywood Corp. v. City
of Algoma, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
In this consolidated opinion the Court devised
the "current operational needs" test. See Note, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 797 (1962).
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 545 (1959).
11. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 657 (1944).
12. See Waring v. Mayor of Mobile, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1868).
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tions on state action.'3 Since adoption of the amendment, the
states' right to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxi14
cating liquor has been held not limited by the commerce clause
15
or the equal protection and due process" clauses of the fourteenth amendment. In addition to recognizing the right to
regulate and prohibit liquor, the Court has held that the states
may tax national liquor,' as there is no constitutional limitation on the taxation of interstate liquor for the reason that the
commerce clause restrictions have been held not applicable. 18
Prior to the instant case there was little jurisprudence
concerning the apparent conflict between the import-export
clause and the twenty-first amendment. The first time the
question arose was in 'California, where an intermediate appellate court held that the twenty-first amendment did not remove foreign liquor from the traditional protection of the import-export clause.' 9 A few years later the Wisconsin Supreme
20
Court reached a similar conclusion.
The instant case presented to the Supreme Court for the first
time the question of the effect of the twenty-first amendment
on the import-export clause. The Court held that the tax on the
imported foreign liquor was prohibited by the import-export
clause, and that the twenty-first amendment did not repeal that
clause with respect to liquor. The majority reasoned that
although the twenty-first amendment had been held in prior
cases to have freed the states from the general limitations of
the commerce clause, the due process clause, and the equal
protection clause, this did not mean that the general language
of the amendment could be said to have impliedly repealed the
specific prohibition on state action found in the import-export
clause. 21 Moreover, nothing in the history of the amendment
13. See Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) : "Without doubt a State
may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale,
or possession, irrespective of when or where produced."

14. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) ; State
Rd. of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1937).
15. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).

16. Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
17. See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939);
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) ; State Bd.
of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1937).
18. See, e.g., cases cited in note 17 8upra.
19. Parrott & Co. v. San Francisco, 131 Cal. App.2d 332, 280 P.2d 881

(.955).

20. State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, 15 Wis.2d 330, 112
N.W.2d 914 (1962).
21. The dissent took

the position that the import-export

clause was also
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indicated an intent to do away with all constitutional prohibitions against state action with respect to liquor. The Court
declared that approval of the Kentucky tax would require holding
that the import-export clause had been completely repealed by
the twenty-first amendment. Because such a result would be
manifestly incongruous with the purpose of the import-export
clause, the Court concluded that the imported liquor, since it
had not lost its status as an import, was still immune from state
taxation.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is sound
and that it has placed the states in appropriate relationship
to the national government as was intended by both the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the Congress of 1933. Taxing
imports involves our international trade policies, and for that
22
reason alone should be in the hands of the national government.
There is a valid distinction between the revenue power and
power to regulate. The power to regulate or even exclude
national and foreign liquor was evidently intended for the states
by the 1933 Congress, but the Court concluded in the instant
case that Congress had not intended for states to tax foreign
liquor. The basic purpose was to give the dry states some power
of self-protection from liquor interests outside those states. 23 A
revenue tax provision is not necessary to this purpose, and is not
permissible because the terms of the import-export clause make
only one exception to the rule prohibiting state taxation of
imports without congressional consent, that being "those imposts
or duties . . . absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
24
laws.
As a result of the instant case the states are allowed a wide
latitude in the exercise of their police power to prohibit or
regulate liquor traffic. The line beyond which the state power
may not extend is drawn at the level of state interference with
2
the exclusively federal right to control taxation of imports. '
general in its prohibition, just as the commerce clause, and that one should not

he regarded as more inviolable than the other. 377 U.S. at 347.
22. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
23. See 76 CONG. REC. 4172 (1933) (remarks of Senator Borah).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2: "T]he net produce of all duties and
imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the
treasury of the United States .... .." This supports the argument that the
Congress cannot be deemed to have consented to the States' having the power to
derive revenue by means of an import tax.
25. See Note, 6 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 336 (1965).
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The Court correctly held that the two provisions were complementary rather than inconsistent, and that the more general
amendment did not repeal the nearly absolute terms of the im26
port-export clause insofar as intoxicating liquors are concerned.
Alex Williams Rankin

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DISCRIMINATION

IN PUBLIC

ACCOMMODATIONS
The constitutionality of the public accommodations section
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 as applied to a motel and a
restaurant was attacked in two recent Supreme Court cases. In
the first case, plaintiff, owner of a motel serving out-of-state
guests but refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief and contended that in passing the act
Congress exceeded its power to regulate commerce and that
the act resulted in a taking of liberty and property without the
due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment in that
plaintiff was deprived of the right to choose his customers and
operate his business as he wished. The defendant counterclaimed for enforcement. The district court sustained this section of the act and issued a permanent injunction restraining
plaintiff from further violation of the act. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Held, there was a rational basis for
Congress to conclude that discrimination in lodging establishments has such an adverse effect on interstate commerce as to
make it a proper object of congressional regulation under the
commerce clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964).
In the second case, plaintiff, operator of a family-owned
restaurant catering to local family and white-collar trade, refused to serve Negroes. The restaurant did not serve transient
guests, but forty-six percent of food purchased had been procured from out of state. Plaintiff asked for injunctive relief
and attacked the constitutionality of the public accommodations section as applied to his restaurant on the ground that
26. Since judicial interpretation appears settled at the present, it seems that
those states that wish to constitutionally tax foreign liquor should attempt to
obtain congressional consent for such an imposition. Under the inport-expor'
clause, a statute by Congress would be sufficient.
1. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1965).

